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In the nineteen eighties there was a brief but intense period of interest amongst literary critics 
and theorists in Classical Rabbinic interpretation, and in particular, the genre of commentary 
known as Midrash. Interest concentrated around the apparent similarities between Midrash and 
the commentaries and criticism of Derrida, Lacan, Freud, Barthes and others. This essay 
examines this connection between Midrash and theory in light of the persistent charge from 
Foucault and others that all hermeneutics is essentially theological. It proceeds by drawing out 
the aims and frustrations of the literary critics and Jewish scholars involved, and considers in 
what ways the questions which arose in these years might be pertinent for contemporary literary 
criticism, theory and institutional practice. 
 
 
[B]aroque complexity (…) endless, nit–picking questions and endless suspensions or 
syncopes, forbidding firm conclusions (…) interminable digressions, each flying off at a 
different tangent (…) something like rabbinical Midrash.  
—J. Hillis Miller, For Derrida 
 
Prelude: Hermeneutic faith 
 
Literary criticism may take place in secular institutions, but until it relinquishes the methods of 
reading inherited from religious textual scholarship, criticism will unwittingly repeat the same 
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theological gestures; hermeneutics presuppose faith, and in the absence of faith, superstition. 
This rebuke to literary hermeneutics, and in particular to close textual analysis, proves persistent. 
For Franco Moretti, ‘close reading (in all of its incarnations, from the new criticism to 
deconstruction)’ is ‘[a]t bottom … a theological exercise—very solemn treatment of very few 
texts taken very seriously’.2 More recently, Heather Love has nuanced the opposition between 
close reading and Moretti’s ‘distant reading’, encouraging us to read in a way which is ‘close but 
not deep’, but for Love too, the target is the ‘sacred aspects of hermeneutics’ that persist in ‘the 
era of secular modernity.’3 While there is certainly a connection between scriptural and literary 
hermeneutics, the ‘incarnations’ of Derrida’s generation are a long way from what Harold Bloom 
called ‘the days of my youth, when professors of literature were a secular clergy.’4 This essay 
considers some aspects of literary hermeneutics—its inclinations and aspirations to the 
theological, but also its frustrations—by returning to the attempts in the 1980s by scholars in 
English and Jewish Studies departments to connect broadly deconstructive reading practices and 
theories to the tradition of Jewish scriptural exegesis known generally as midrash. The midrash-
theory connection, as it would later be named, allows us to apply some pressure to the claim that 
theoretical literary reading is ‘a theological exercise’. It opens once more the question of the dual 
inheritance of Anglophone scholarship, classical and Judeo-Christian. And it provides an 
opportunity to consider the relevance of those negotiations between literary studies and midrash 
for criticism today. 
Before we begin, I want situate the debate briefly. By theory, I mean that particularly 
American phenomenon whereby European philosophy was imported and adapted to the work 
of literary criticism, notably in English and French departments (and not in philosophy).5 The 
connection between theory and a number of high-profile literary critics had been cemented in 
1979 by the publication of Deconstruction and Criticism which printed Derrida alongside Harold 
Bloom, Geoffrey Hartman, J. Hillis Miller and Paul de Man, all employed in a small number of 
East coast American departments. In short, ‘theory’ here signifies not Paris but Ithaca, Baltimore 
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and, above all, New Haven.6 The distinction between theory and criticism was blurry at best, not 
least because breaking down that distinction was one of the points, but where possible, I will use 
‘criticism’ to designate the work of the critics, and ‘theory’ for the continental work they drew 
upon. 
It will also be helpful to outline what, for its detractors, is theological about literary 
hermeneutics. For this we can turn to Foucault, whose simultaneous presence in what Marc 
Redfield has called the French theory ‘trinity’, and opposition to the approaches of the other two 
(Derrida and Lacan), captures some of the inherent contradictions of the category.7 In his 
inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, Foucault stated that commentary ‘exorcises the chance 
element of discourse by giving it its due; it allows us to say something other than the text itself, 
but on the condition that it is this text itself which is said, and in a sense, completed’.8 
Commentary, in the way Foucault uses the term here, covers all textual criticism; any discussion 
of what a text says or does requires paraphrase, but must add something of interest to that 
paraphrase if it is to be worthwhile. Yet what it adds must have been already implicit in the 
original, else it is unjustified. Thus the commentary both infinitely expands, and essentially 
preserves, the text upon which it comments; it can neither be ‘the text itself’, whose meanings it 
can only reproduce inexactly, nor can it venture to express a thought truly independent of it, or 
else it would become something else, such as philosophy or history, and so remains caught in 
this neither–nor position (this sentence being a case in point).9 Our attempts to name the 
element of the text beyond what is already written will always amount to chasing ghosts. Such 
formulations recall the preface to The Birth of the Clinic, where Foucault writes: 
to comment is to admit by definition an excess of the signified over the signifier; a 
necessary, unformulated remainder of thought that language has left in the shade (…) By 
opening up the possibility of commentary, this double plethora dooms us to an endless task 
that nothing can limit (…) This is an exegesis, which listens, through the prohibitions, the 
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symbols, the concrete images, through the whole apparatus of Revelation, to the Word of 
God, ever secret, ever beyond itself.10 
Nothing in the commentary itself is theological for Foucault; rather, commentary is structurally 
theological. Since what appears is never enough, ‘one has to re–state what has never been said.’11 
At best, commentary reproduces infinite longing, at worst, interminable prevarication. 
Foucault’s critique suggests why literary critics might be interested in scriptural 
hermeneutics—as the unrepressed version of their own craft, as it were. But it doesn’t explain 
why proponents of modern literary theory in particular would willingly associate it with explicitly 
theological inquiry. Even to its detractors, theory never lacked self-awareness. Indeed, a restless 
concern with method draws theory and midrash together, and ultimately pushes them apart. 
I close this introductory section with a brief chronology intended both to provide an 
overview of the episode for unfamiliar readers, and to emphasise its surprising brevity; the 
midrash-theory connection may have been ‘a “hot” topic’ in both literary studies and Jewish 
studies, as David Stern later noted, 12 but when one accounts for the time spent in press, the 
project in its original form was over almost as soon as it began: 
1980 G. Douglas Atkins, ‘Dehellenizing Literary Criticism’ 
Geoffrey Hartman, Criticism in the Wilderness 
1981 Inaugural issue of Prooftexts (Jewish studies journal interested in ‘contemporary 
issues of textuality’) 
1982 Susan Handelman, The Slayers of Moses 
1983 Collaborative research project on literature and midrash at The Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem (two years) 
1984 David Stern, review of The Slayers of Moses in Prooftexts 
1985 Handelman, response to Stern in Prooftexts 
1986 Geoffrey Hartman and Sanford Budick (eds), Midrash and Literature (resulting 
from the project at Jerusalem) 
1987 Jacob Neusner, Midrash as Literature 
1988 David Stern, ‘Midrash and Indeterminacy’ 
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Elisa New, ‘Pharaoh’s Birthstool: Deconstruction and Midrash’ 
 
By the time that the fruits of the Jerusalem research project were published in 1986, the critique 
of the most ambitious version of the midrash-theory connection had already been articulated 
(notably by Stern and Neusner). At the end of the decade, the prospect of midrash as a mode of 
literary criticism had fallen away. In the years following, those in Jewish studies sympathetic to 
theory studied the application of theoretical concepts to biblical reading.13 In English 
departments, the question was largely historicised, producing compelling comparisons of 
hermeneutic methods, but eliding the riven question of ‘doing’ midrash.14 The interaction 
between literary and Jewish studies ultimately emphasized disciplinary divisions rather than 
overcoming them. I do not aim to rehabilitate the debate in its initial form, but to analyse why it 
unfolded as it did, to ask what literary criticism desired from midrash in those optimistic early 
inquiries and, given that it didn’t get what it wanted, to consider where it was left.  
 
Midrash as critical method 
 
Why were American literary critics, steeped in ‘French theory’, psychoanalysis and 
deconstruction, drawn to Midrash, a body of Jewish homiletic and exegetical commentary 
produced between 200 and 800 CE, and to its associated methods?15 The Classical Rabbinic 
tradition placed the study of texts at the centre of life.16 It is to be expected that literary critics 
would warm to people like themselves. But there are much more significant reasons for this 
particular attraction. One striking hermeneutic assumption in Midrash is that every element of 
scripture is meaningful, ‘nothing in it is arbitrary, let alone without meaning’.17 Every detail is 
available: ‘not only the meaning of terms and words, but also their shapes and sounds, the 
te’amim (the musical signs added to the Hebrew words), the tagin (the small decorative additions 
to the letters)’, details unavailable in translation, and therefore in Christian scholarship in Latin or 
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vernacular languages.18 This means that no element of the text can be dismissed as contingent. 
Tiny redundancies are resolved by ingenious means.19 If there is no opposition between form 
and content (or word and spirit, the polemical Christian analogue), readers are at least somewhat 
protected from the charges of under- and over-interpretation, literalism and excessive 
imagination. Hartman would later comment that 
What we call ‘rhetoric’ and ‘poetics’—arts indebted to Greek and Roman thought—did 
not separate out as technical branches of knowledge during the formative period of 
talmudic Judaism.20 
In Hartman’s account Biblical Hebrew returns as a language which eludes the poverty of the 
form/content binary—the weightless meaning and the arbitrary sign. However brilliant Paul de 
Man’s deconstruction of Wordsworth’s boy of Winander, however rigorous and tender 
Hartman’s account of Wordsworth’s ‘elation’ or ‘muteness’, one cannot avoid feeling that the 
poet is being given something he did not already possess.21 Their brilliance always runs the risk 
of transcendence. By contrast, Midrash ‘refuses to produce a new or transformed writing’; it will 
not deviate, and ‘looks for more of the original in the original, for more story, more words 
within the words.’22 
For the Rabbis, every element of scripture holds ‘an infinity of significances’; ‘every word 
of the Torah is pregnant with an immensity of meanings’.23 From this it also follows that no 
human could ever grasp the whole significance, and thus multiple interpretations can be 
simultaneously legitimate. ‘Rabbi Eleazar’, Joseph Dan notes, ‘was not bothered by the 
contradictions, apparent or real, involved in interpreting the same verse many times according to 
different midrashic methods.’24 The tolerance for multiple interpretations permits the Midrash ‘a 
combination of different and variegated ways of reading a single text, maintaining all of its details 
(such as its spelling or word order), completing its gaps, solving real or imagined contradictions 
found within it, and explaining and interpreting it in every possible way, sometimes with absolute 
disregard for its literary or linguistic context.’25 All these interpretations form, in Avigdor 
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Shinan’s striking image, ‘a giant upside–down pyramid with a small apex, the Bible’.26 To a 
modern eye, there is something pleasingly outrageous about the interpretive latitude. Certainly as 
a literary critic one is sometimes tempted to trample over the common-sense meaning of a 
sentence that undermines one’s otherwise brilliant explanation. And because nobody could 
purport to know the thinking of God, there is no question of a Rabbi being confronted with a 
dry appeal to ‘the author’s intended meaning’.27 Faithful to the meaning of every word, letter and 
diacritical mark, interpretation can take great liberties. 
In Hartman’s Criticism in the Wilderness, Biblical criticism serves as a point of favourable 
comparison. Modern (demystified) criticism, Hartman hints in the opening essay, is caught 
between believing literature’s invention too credulously and dismissing it with unnecessary 
scepticism, at least in part because it lacks the faith held by ‘the older Hermeneutics’.28 At the 
beginning of another essay, he remarks: 
The rabbinical or patrisitic exegete was creative within a scrupulosity as exacting as any 
invented by extreme apostles of the Catholic or Puritan conscience; he pretended not to 
violate the letter of Scripture or else he took pleasure in the strict counterpoint of letter 
and spirit, of apparent meaning and recreative commentary. The puritanism (small p) of so 
much critical writing today, its modest but unconvincing subservience to art, comes from 
the realization that now it is we who put the restraint on ourselves; it is from the individual 
critic that the check on subjective or wild interpretation must come.29 
If literary criticism is spilt theology, for Hartman it is also paradoxically more pious; precisely 
because ‘the rabbinical or patrisitic exegete’ can invoke higher powers, his or her interpretation 
can risk more. If we hear in Hartman’s wish for creativity and scrupulosity the virtuosic risk–
taking prized by deconstruction, we might also detect the anxiety of its detractors that 
interpretive violations, pleasurable or otherwise, represented an attack on literary meaning and 
value. Hartman’s subsequent discussions of Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Derrida fail to displace 
his nostalgia for the controlled energy of religious exegesis. Of the four ‘“other worlds” that 
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tempt the interpreter’ in ‘Past and Present’, the first is ‘the midrashic or polysemous world of 
biblical interpretation, where extremely bold hypotheses and strict rules of exegesis keep 
company’.30 The other three are all roughly contemporary movements in theory: existential 
hermeneutics (Heidegger), dialogism, and ‘the conceptual, even noumenal, rhetoric’ which 
Hartman uses with some elasticity to encompass writers ‘from Claude Lévi–Strauss and Jacques 
Lacan to Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida’.31 Midrash, implicitly, is presented as a species of 
Continental theory. 
If the hermeneutic freedom of Midrash appeals, so too does its style. As if anticipating the 
playful approaches of theory, ‘midrashic discourse mixes text and commentary, violating the 
boundaries between them and intentionally blurring the differences, flourishing (…) between 
exegesis and literature’.32 And anyone partial to the extreme punning and digression of Lacan and 
Derrida will enjoy finding in Midrash ‘an intrepid delight in word play, an imaginative precocity 
and a resistance to what is nowadays called closure akin to the most daring of deconstructionist 
acrobatics’.33 
The midrash-theory connection, however, was not built on the mere comparison between 
midrash and contemporary criticism; what brought the two together was ultimately the 
suggestion that there might be a shared method to midrash and theory. Hartman intimated that 
they might be analogous ‘worlds’. G. Douglas Atkins went further by ‘suggesting what at least 
some of the “Yale critics” seem aware of: their opposition to Hellenism and the classical logos 
derives from notions strikingly similar to Hebraic and biblical thought.’34 For Atkins, critics had 
been ‘dehellenizing literary criticism’ for some time. But Atkins defines ‘Hebraism’ very broadly 
indeed: ‘Bloom … “prefers the morality of the Hebrew Bible to that of Homer” … signs of 
Hebraism appear variously in Miller’s work in the 1960s, and as early as 1954 Hartman was 
writing in The Unmediated Vision about immersion in experience itself at the expense of a 
transcendent principle.’35 
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The continuity between midrash and theory is articulated more precisely in Susan 
Handelman’s book The Slayers of Moses: The emergence of rabbinic interpretation in modern literary theory, 
whose title alludes provocatively to Freud’s Moses and Monotheism. Handelman contends that a 
group of more-or-less secular Jews—Freud, Lacan, Derrida, Bloom—were the inheritors of the 
Jewish sacred exegetical tradition (note Lacan’s honorary Judaism). Handelman traces from 
midrash to deconstruction a persistent, if marginalized, alternative to ‘Hellenic’ modes of 
philosophy. Rather than assert direct historical links between her theorists and rabbinic tradition, 
Handelman poses ‘striking and profound structural affinities’ with Rabbinic models of 
interpretation.36 Hence, ‘the Biblical view was a kind of “deconstruction” of the classical idea’ 
and ‘the Rabbinic world is, to use a contemporary term, one of intertextuality.’37 In this way, 
historical midrash can be aligned with contemporary opposition to metalanguage in Barthes, 
Derrida and Lacan. The metaphysics of presence and the Christian attitude to scripture (which 
prizes Christ qua body over the book) are, in important respects for Handelman, the same 
thing.38 Synthetic work like this performed two important functions: it substantiated the claims 
that there was a midrash-theory connection and it provided a historical grounding for 
contemporary criticism. The book was therefore both affirmed and substantiated the wider 
attempt ‘to find a genealogy, a precursor, for theory itself’ at a time when, we should remember, 
it stood accused of ‘destroying literary studies’.39 
Two more reasons for attraction need to be mentioned. Firstly, the episode was a rare, 
genuine moment of interdisciplinarity. What looks like interdisciplinarity often turns out to be 
quasi-transcendental: one field claims ownership of the other’s conditions of possibility, as in the 
relation of philosophy of science to science or, more recently, of neuroscience to various fields 
of the humanities. And when they do engage, disciplines often turn to another for expert 
witnesses, invoked to back up what one already believes, but cannot itself prove, or else as a 
cannibal, hoping to fatten itself by consuming the other outright. But unlike the Bible-as-
literature criticism project which, Stern later asserted, was one more attempt to appropriate 
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Hebrew texts for Christian scholarship, here ‘the academy seemed to be authentically excited 
about something Jewish’.40 What is more, Hartman and Sanford Budick’s edited volume, Midrash 
and Literature, contained authors from Jewish studies (David Stern, Moshe Idel) and literary critics 
(Frank Kermode, Jill Robbins), and concluded with an appendix of ‘contemporary midrash’ 
which reprinted Derrida’s essay ‘Shibboleth’ and Edmund Jabès’ ‘The Key’. While the volume 
was published in New Haven, and not Jerusalem, and although both editors’ experience was 
squarely in English literature (romantic and seventeenth–century poetry, respectively) it is a 
shared enterprise, in which no worldview or method dominates. Indeed, Lilian Furst and Michael 
Goldberg’s objection that ‘it takes two people even to do a review’ signalled the book’s success 
as much as its shortcomings.41 
Finally, it must be acknowledged that Midrash was discussed in English departments in a 
manner that at least somewhat exoticised it. Sometimes the rhetoric recalls the moves by feminist 
scholars to ‘recover’ women’s writing, and such rhetoric emphasised the alleged marginality of 
the Jewish as an ‘alien’ and ‘subterranean influence’.42 Midrash can ‘remind secular literary studies 
of the richness and subtlety of those strange rabbinic conversations which have been disdained 
for so long in favour of more objective and systematized modes of reading.’43 At the same time, 
the turn to Midrash allowed readers familiar with Glas the thrill of recognizing its interlaced text 
and commentary in the pages of the Talmud. (The Slayers of Moses actually re–prints a page of 
Glas.)44 Already in this juxtaposition we can see tension: the Hebrew material is valued both on 
the grounds of its proximity to contemporary theory and its supposedly alien qualities. 
What unites all of those advocating a midrash-theory connection is the suggestion that 
Derrida’s deconstruction, Lacan’s seminars, Freud’s interpretation of dreams and indeed good 
literary criticism in general share something of importance with the playful and exacting 
midrashic commentary. But when one ventures claims about particular concepts, difficulties 
arise. By asserting the structural likeness of allusion in midrash and intertextuality in Derrida and 
Lacan, for instance, Handelman’s book can seem to position theory as the successor to midrash 
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(‘the Slayers of Moses’, no less), implying that contemporary scholars of Midrash studied a dead 
language, while theory constituted a living word. The Hebrew scholars had, one suspects, heard 
that one before. Hartman and Budick’s introduction softened Handelman’s syncretism, declaring 
interest in both 
the historical, cultural, Judaic phenomenon of midrash itself, and the resemblances 
between midrash and highly similar critical phenomena which, for whatever reasons, have 
acquired central importance in contemporary literature, criticism and theory. Of course, 
resemblance is not identity.45 
The crucial phrase here is also the least assuming: ‘for whatever reasons’. Indeed, it suggests that 
resemblances might be the most we can know, and that the reasons must be bracketed out. 
Handelman’s claim of inheritance is weakened to one of family resemblance, but Hartman and 
Budick expressed similar desires for practical knowledge. For literary criticism, what made 
midrash attractive was ultimately the prospect of methodological innovation, but taking midrash 
as a method requires an abstraction which exposes the inherent tension in the project. 
 
Criticism and difference 
 
Midrash and Literature is an ambivalent book. It represents the apex of interdisciplinary 
cooperation, and contains the germ of the critique which would end it. In his chapter, Stern 
contends that Midrash ‘touches upon literature not at the point where literature becomes 
exegesis but at what might be called its opposite conjunctions, where exegesis turns into 
literature and comes to express its own language and voice’.46 Stern’s approach is characteristic 
of those in Jewish studies who wished to engage with theory while retaining the historical and 
textual specificity of midrashic commentary. In practical terms, if one studies Midrash itself, it 
can be ‘literature’ with ‘its own language and voice’, but if one is to think of midrash as a 
method, it must bear no essential link to scripture. The dispute, at its heart, focused on how far 
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one could abstract the notion of midrash and still use the term. As Betty Roitman noted in her 
chapter, ‘the mobility and indeterminacy of midrash no doubt explains its attractiveness to 
present–day theoreticians who understand midrash in a way that feeds their faith in an infinite 
unfolding of textual signification. But this contemporary adaptation (…) involves some 
considerable adaptation of the données of midrash.47 Roitman’s ‘considerable adaptation’ is a 
charitable way to signal grave differences. 
The key problem concerns the categorical opposition between Hebrew and Hellene 
criticism. Inevitably, the comparison of midrash to theory tended to reify midrash as something 
discrete and stable, when, as Daniel Boyarin notes, ‘Midrashic texts were produced over a period 
of more than a thousand years, and therefore, show different rhetorical and hermeneutic styles’.48 
To suppose midrash and theory to be categories sufficiently similar and uniform to compare is to 
make caricatures of them. In his combative review of The Slayers of Moses in Prooftexts, Stern 
accuses Handelman of reifying ‘the rabbinic–patristic distinction (…) making her own position 
seem as literalistic and dichotomous as the one she attributes to the Greeks and the Christians’.49 
The fiery version of the categorical objection comes from Jacob Neusner, who contends that the 
term midrash should be rejected because ‘as a category, midrash meaning simply all “Jewish” or 
“Judaic exegesis” but no gentile exegesis rests upon self–referential, therefore essentially inherent 
(that is, racist) lines. Appeals to innate traits (…) settle no important questions for reasonable 
people’.50 Neusner goes on to indict ‘Kugel and those others published in the book edited by 
Hartman (and his colleagues in the sectarian literary journal, Prooftexts)’ for deceiving ‘their gentile 
colleagues, both allies and otherwise, who, not being Jewish, assume both that the literature at 
hand has been accurately represented’.51 Without going so far, it is clear that while the historical 
practice of midrash was part of Jewish history, the historical sense in which midrash is Jewish 
cannot simply be extended to the abstract account implied by any suggestion that contemporary 
criticism might be, or might benefit from being, midrashic. 
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Beyond this sort of critique, though, scholars from Jewish studies provided nuanced 
reasons to qualify the connections between midrash and theory. Dan writes: 
The midrash (from a functional point of view) is the result of the inherent paradox which 
haunts a religion based upon a body of sacred scriptures: the conflict between the wish 
and the need to innovate, and the religious maxim which states that all truth is to be 
found in the scriptures. This means that, in order to be true, every new statement should 
be old. The midrashic technique is the traditional Jewish answer to this paradox.52 
Hence, as David Stern writes in ‘Midrash and Indeterminacy’, the 1988 Critical Inquiry article 
which consolidated his critique of Handelman, ‘the Rabbis consciously, happily, assume the 
stance of belatedness. (…) Polysemy in midrash, then, is to be understood as a claim to textual 
stability rather than its opposite’.53 Indeterminacy in midrash, Stern insists, is not the endless 
shifting of the signifier, but the agglutination of all the infinities of scripture. What may have 
appeared compatible with the Derridean project, in other words, is really ‘a recuperation of 
presence’.54 Midrash is thus opposed in important ways to the deconstructive project to which, 
for Handelman, it bore strong resemblance. A simple distinction: deconstruction finds that what 
the text articulates is at odds with the articulation itself; the textual undermines the hermeneutic. 
For Midrash, the textual generates ever more significance; it is coal for the hermeneutic fire. The 
multiple interpretations of midrash (its recurrent davar aher, ‘another interpretation’) which 
appear so attractive to the literary critic are produced, Dan and Stern suggest, not by exegetical 
technique but by the special status of the text being read.55 They approach similar exegetical 
assumptions (polysemy, intertextuality) from different directions. ‘[T]he seamless knit between 
the text and its interpretation may obtain (…) owing to the postmodern dearth of authority, or 
to the infinite authority of a God whose text encompasses everything’, Elisa New writes. ‘The 
radically sacred and the radically secular dovetail here in an unsettling way’.56 
Reviewing Handelman, Stern also makes a striking accusation: by claiming a sacred 
inheritance for literary theory, Handelman is betraying its ‘profoundly secular background’ in an 
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‘intellectual, not religious (…) act of idolatry.’57 If literary criticism is for Foucault and others too 
theological, for Stern it is nowhere near theological enough to support Handelman’s 
comparisons. In this debate it can be difficult to separate the question of intellectual territory 
from the dispute about hermeneutics. Handelman unfairly takes Stern’s critique to be a simple 
historian’s wish to discuss ‘what midrash “reflects” of its historical background’ at the expense of 
the literary critic’s insight into ‘language and textuality’.58 Stern likewise gives a less than generous 
account of Handelman’s theoretical readers ‘who (at least the way she describes them) seem to 
be mainly interested in ruthlessly trumping their literary predecessors’.59 Even the way 
Handelman is introduced to readers of Prooftexts emphasises disciplinary boundaries (‘Susan A. 
Handelman, who teaches English at the University of Maryland’).60 This matters because the 
engagement between midrash and theory is always at risk of collapsing into a problem of 
description, as if the literary critics describe midrash inadequately and the midrash critics describe 
theory imperfectly, and if only both descriptions were corrected we would know one way or the 
other whether the two fit together. The difficulty is much more substantial than this. 
An asymmetry exists between midrash and theory because theory already contains an 
internal opposition between Hebrew and Hellene. As Miriam Leonard has shown, the long-
standing debate between ‘Greek’ and ‘Jewish’ thought—between Socrates and Moses—in 
Western philosophy played an important role in the articulation of Enlightenment universalism. 
To simplify Leonard’s nuanced discussion: the Hebrew/Hellene opposition provides a way for 
Christian philosophers to renegotiate their intellectual heritage and claim ownership of classical 
philosophy; ‘[l]ike Hamann, Kant sketches a continuity between Hellenism and Christianity, a 
continuity that is based on the antithetical characteristics of Judaism and Christianity.’ 61 And 
Hegel’s subsequent critique of Kant is analogous to his critique of Judaism; both are too 
dependent on positivistic laws and must be surpassed; Hegel overcomes Kant, and Hegel’s 
rarefied Christianity the religion of Abraham. Indeed, ‘Christianity’s triumph is to liberate itself 
of Judaism by revealing itself as always already Greek.’62 The Hebrew/Hellene comparison has 
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long been polemical; ‘not that the Christians and the Jews read absolutely differently’ but that 
Christians wanted to ‘make an absolute difference between Jews and Christians and to accuse 
Jews of mistaken or wrong interpretations’ to defend their own.63 As a result, European 
philosophy is already implicated in the Hebrew/Hellene opposition, including the late twentieth-
century kinds that became ‘theory’. When Derrida begins ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ with an 
epigraph from Culture and Anarchy, he summons Arnold’s ‘immersion in language of racial 
typology’ as well as his efforts to adapt that language to questions of English culture.64 
To put the problem another way: the question of ‘connecting’ theory to Midrash gets stuck 
because that theory can neither resolve, nor propel itself beyond, the long history of Hebrew and 
Hellene oppositions. ‘Hebraism … has always been severely preoccupied with an awful sense of 
the impossibility of being at ease in Zion’, Matthew Arnold wrote.65 And Derrida’s Jewishness 
can be understood as an opposition to ‘the Greco-European adventure [that] is in the process of 
taking over all of humanity’.66 But if this is all there is—an opposition to ‘Greco-European’ 
universalism, ‘an awful sense’ of ‘impossibility’—this is no more than the mere inversion of the 
(Christian) narrative of intellectual progress in which ‘Jewish’ particularities are replaced by 
‘Greek’ universals. Thus when John Caputo characterizes Derrida’s Jewishness in terms of ‘the 
place of the Jew, the place of the displaced, [that] is always occupied by someone, whatever their 
name’, we no longer need the language of race.67 It is comparable to Lacan’s category of woman: 
the marginal, the not-all, the position which refuses totality68 and the sexing or racializing of a 
structural position that is not essential to a sex or race is, at the very least, difficult. Saying 
nothing of Paul de Man, deconstruction’s relation to Jewishness is fraught. And the question of 
Derrida’s Jewish faith remains contested.69 Yet nor can the structural (philosophical, political) 
position be separated from the historical (ethnicity, religion, community) without violence. 
Between a general position which anyone could in principle occupy and the particular experience 
of a historical group, ‘the oscillation and the undecidability continue’, Derrida writes; ‘[i]n any 
case, I have been unable to put a stop to this experience in me’.70 To cleave one way or the other 
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is to give up something important. It is reductive to merely historicize theory; an appeal to 
Jewish history (or worse, ethnicity) cannot explain deconstruction, or psychoanalysis. But if we 
abstract from the particulars of that history, until all that is left is an abstract, structural position 
(a taste for the marginal, latent, unstable or impossible, a claim against totality) we have not put 
the Hebrew/Hellene opposition to rest but made the most ‘Greek’ move of all: setting aside 
historical particularity by claiming to overcome it. 
The intuition of a connection between theory and midrash seems promising, but any 
attempt to explain that connection on the grounds of Jewishness is destined to get stuck. The 
question of whether theory, or particular concepts, are ‘Jewish’, cannot be posed without 
resolving a vast debate over the relation of Western philosophy to history, a debate in which 
theory itself, being thoroughly implicated, cannot resolve. It may seem that the problem can be 
avoided by ignoring questions of identity and metaphysics, and concentrating on method. After 
all, literary criticism routinely appropriates the techniques of history, sociology and philosophy 
without necessarily addressing the intellectual disagreements between the fields. But from the 
perspective of professional students of Midrash, the a priori differences between scripture and 
literature cannot be waved away, and any attempt to do so appears not only cavalier with regard 
to scripture, but also careless in its handling of literature’s own singularity.  
By 1988, a project to synthesize midrash and theory became untenable. Midrash and 
Literature was not followed by further collaborative interdisciplinary work. In 1994, Hartman 
advised, in lieu of collaboration or synthesis, that we ‘ask not what deconstruction may do for 
Midrash; [but] ask what Midrash may do for deconstruction’.71 In the introduction to Midrash and 
Theory (1996), Stern responds that his purpose is ‘to ask not what midrash can do for literary 
criticism but what theory has done to midrash’.72 On this basis, the two part ways. In short, the 
midrash–theory connection ‘was too good to be true, at least in its more exaggerated, idealized, 
and apologetic expressions’.73 Having worked though the interactions between the fields, it is 
possible to respond to the contention that theoretical reading, insofar as it remains hermeneutic, 
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is ‘a theological exercise’. Derrida and Freud, for instance, can be said to assume the infinity of 
the text (call it textual instability or interminable analysis). Nobody would deny Walter Benjamin 
‘the whole apparatus of Revelation’ (Foucault’s phrase). Lacan and Cixous fit Foucault’s 
description of theological readers, as do the ‘Yale’ practitioners of the 1980s (de Man, Bloom, 
Hartman, Hillis Miller, Shoshana Felman), who are willing to read beyond what is written in 
order to capture what is written. Foucault’s complaint is, in other words, that purportedly secular 
commentary remains all too Hebrew. In making the midrash-theory connection, the differences 
did not trouble the literary critics. But when those in Jewish studies reaffirmed the theological 
commitments of the Rabbis, the project began to fall apart. Faced with a concrete example of 
properly theological reading, the differences became clear. Affirmations of presence are 
unavailable to it; theory must ruin the sacred truths. 
 
Retrospect: After midrash and theory 
 
Returning to these questions a generation later, the project of aligning contemporary 
criticism with a body of exegesis separated by genre, geography and so much history can seem 
quaint. But insurmountable differences are what makes the comparison useful: Midrash exists 
outside of the (Euro-centric) Hebrew/Hellene opposition; it becomes available to our thinking 
about criticism today on the basis of those differences. Hartman, always much more ambivalent 
about literary criticism’s claim to be secular, was from the beginning conscious of acting in an 
idolatrous way towards profane poetry. ‘Our imitation of sacred exegesis is consciously archaic 
or a mock–up unless we believe in authority; that of the sacred text and, by extension, of our 
own, critical text’, he wrote in 1980.74 If literary critics were attracted to midrash because they 
recognized elements they prized in their own work, and the theorists they read, those critics were 
also attracted to those elements their work could not have. ‘Faith and grace, albeit secularized, 
are the indispensable hermeneutic tools’, writes Antoine Compagnon.75 But tools cannot be 
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altered without changing the nature of the craft; if criticism is to be faithful, or indeed graceful, it 
must be so in different ways. The midrash-theory connection speaks to a shapeless wish for new 
kinds of readerly diligence and play. In this final section, I reflect on some of the ways in which 
midrash remains a worthwhile point of comparison to hermeneutic practices and institutional 
conventions in contemporary literary studies not in spite, but because, of their differences. 
The Rabbis’ belatedness turns a (supposed) lack of originality into an index of 
faithfulness to the text. In Anglophone literary criticism it would be hard to admit to reading 
belatedly, even if it were true that one has no original ideas. Drawing a different comparison, 
Eric Hayot writes: 
If you grew up in China, (…) you will have learned that one of the most 
epistemologically powerful things an essay can do—especially if written by a junior 
scholar—is to show that its arguments resemble those of an existing authority figure. 
This is usually proved by parallel citation. Unfortunately, that structure has little truth–
value in the U.S. context, where a strong emphasis on originality (and on telling the 
reader how exactly you are original) means that you produce epistemological strength by 
distancing yourself from at least some of the experts in your field.76 
Anglophone academic publishing demands novelty as a condition of entry, even as it demands 
that however novel, the interpretation will yet be an accurate account of the text. Interpretations 
are, therefore, presumed to improve; not like Moore’s law, perhaps, but at least like competing 
products in a marketplace. Nevertheless, it might be possible to think about belated 
interpretation,  so that Pierre Bayard’s clever recent sketch of ‘anticipatory plagiarism’, which 
insists that literary influence travels backwards as well as forwards, can be turned on its head.77 
Rather than say that newness or originality can proliferate backwards through literary history, so 
that Sophocles is revealed as a plagiarist of Freud, we might say that the power of Freud’s 
interpretation of culture derives from a certain lack of originality. The persuasive force of much 
of Freud’s writing, like that of Sartre and certain other strains of phenomenology, relies on its 
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reader’s recognition of something they already knew—it relies on the ‘shock of the old’. It is not 
that Freud failed to be original, but rather that he succeeded, far more than most, in making his 
readers feel that a very old story was occurring all around them. One merit, at least, of a more 
belated approach to criticism would be to downplay the importance of mere newness, which 
occurs at both ends of the methodological spectrum: the clamour for fresh, un-studied 
manuscripts on the one hand, and the tendency to treat theory as ‘disruptive innovation’ on the 
other. Regarding New Historicism and, more recently, ‘new lyric studies’, Redfield remarks: ‘the 
fact that in the American academy everything always has to be “new” does not, of course, 
protect against repetition’.78 
In a similar way to belatedness, the status of the contradiction marks a sticking point 
between criticism and midrash, even if we believe in something like the infinite significances of 
Shakespeare. ‘To read Dickens and Shakespeare is now to read the history of what has been and 
might be made of them’, Steven Connor has recently contended.79 But that long history, with its 
reversals and revisions, is rarely understood as the dialectical unfolding of knowledge about 
Shakespeare so much as a clearing–house of competing interpretations. Institutional organization 
reflects this; there are many undergraduate survey courses on Shakespeare and few on the history 
of Shakespeare criticism. Criticism, but never literature, can be dismissed as outdated (if it is 
outdated to study it, this fact counts against its claim to literary qualities). Contradictions must be 
cast out as mistakes and falsehoods in criticism and teaching alike. Imagine the following 
pedagogical experiment: a class in which students were asked to produce several contradictory 
interpretations of the same poem, and assessed on the basis of how rigorous their commentaries 
are, but penalized for giving accounts which are compatible with one another. It would be far 
more taxing, and the results likely far more compelling, than requiring students to be correct about 
romantic period lyrics. 
If contradictory interpretations can be tolerated, it is no longer necessary to prove all 
others wrong in order to be right. Literary criticism’s own davar aher, so to speak, is the 
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invocation that ‘existing research in the field overlooks …’ In the grant application and the 
journal article, there must be a ‘gap in the scholarship’ through which each new work exposes 
the ignorance and partiality of the last. And given the demands exerted on those writing the 
grant applications and articles, such gaps are inevitably found. But the economy of critical insight 
does not need to run on the currency of others’ wrongness; interpretation is not a zero–sum 
game. (Consider the unhappy case of E.D. Hirsch trying to adjudicate between two ‘equally 
coherent and self-sustaining’ interpretations of Wordsworth.)80 When interpretive contradiction 
is thinkable, when the thankless work of trying to dismiss everyone else can be put aside, 
criticism becomes less risk-averse on its own account. Hartman speaks approvingly of criticism 
which ‘can dare to go wrong’.81 Similarly, ‘[t]he term “error” has for de Man a furious conceptual 
energy’, Stanley Corngold comments, noting his enthusiasm in Blindness and Insight for ‘the part 
truth of error’.82 Of course, it is easier to appreciate the other fellow’s wrongness. But in his 
reading of ‘wrong poetry’, Keston Sutherland reminds us of Adorno’s injunction against the wish 
to be right above all: 
Nothing is more unfitting for an intellectual resolved on practising what was earlier called 
philosophy, than to wish, in discussion, and one might almost say in argumentation, to 
be right.83 
The alternative in this sketch is dialectical philosophy, which learns ‘not to reject wrong (…) but, 
more onerously, to be wrong and by that fundamental advance to lose itself’.84 The charge that 
criticism puts its own rightness first, and would rather be impervious to objections than risk 
engaging with its object in ways that might expose it to criticism, also appears in Bruno Latour’s 
oft–cited essay against the sort of critique which, he tells us, has ‘run out of steam’: ‘[d]o you see 
now why it feels so good to be a critical mind? Why critique, this most ambiguous pharmakon, has 
become such a potent euphoric drug? You are always right!’85 What would criticism which did 
not seek primarily to be right look like? The charm of Freud’s dream work, but also its deep 
interpretive power, stem from its tendency to generate ‘wrong’ interpretations of the day’s 
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residues, in whose unconcealed wrongness (that is, transgression) lies the possibility of cognitive 
leaps excluded from diurnal thought, and in those leaps, insight otherwise unavailable. To think 
about this belatedly: in a sense, textual scholarship has, since the medieval period, been a 
working through of error. ‘Narratives of scholarship always seem to take error as their subject’, 
Seth Lerer writes. ‘They correct the mistakes of others, but they also expose the ways in which 
the wrong, the errant, the displaced are central to the makings of professional identity.’86 
Although criticism cannot be wrong in the same way as the unconscious mind, or contradictory 
in the same way as Midrash, we might yet ask in what ways criticism can relinquish its demand 
for rightness, so that wrong discoveries may throw up as much of interest and value as those 
which are the most insistently right. 
Midrash may have proven attractive to some in literary studies because it aroused the 
latent ‘weak messianism’ in their own practices. To that extent Foucault’s critique lands a blow. 
But rather than say that those critics were simply mistaken or superstitious, we might see the 
intuition that theory could be a contemporary midrash not as ‘a falsehood but merely a claim 
unfulfilled by men’.87 Neither criticism’s alleged theologism nor its genuine lack of faith justify its 
dismissal unless one already expected it to be social science or religion. Separating out literary 
criticism from the properly faithful exegesis by its side further exposes another kind of wishful 
thinking: for the sort of criticism that keeps its object at arm’s length rather than risk accusations 
of fetishism or misplaced devotion, as if they were they only kinds of commitment available. 
Further, the encounter between midrash and theory suggests a way forward for interdisciplinary 
work other than one field’s subservience to, or cannibalism of, the other: instead, a relation of 
mutual provocation that, when handled well, can interrupt the automatic gestures and settled 
conclusions of each field that stand in the way of thinking. In the absence of the faith invested in 
scripture by the devout, a space opens for criticism which is severe and yet joyful, insightful yet 
unafraid of error, unfinished but not insufficient. The ‘endless task’ of criticism which draws 
Foucault’s ire and the charge of theologism represents not the fullness of God’s infinity, but an 
22  
infinity with no redemptive endpoint, only the hum of interpretation endlessly unfolding, each 
stroke ‘bringing short–lived meanings to long–lived words.’88 For criticism, the significance of 
literature is not guaranteed in advance by the special status of the author, but sustained by the 
whole history of interpretive work devoted to it; not faith in reading, but strenuous affection. 
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